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A NUDGE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION WITH A STICK THE SIZE 
OF CMS: PHYSICIAN-PATIENT COMMUNICATION 
AT THE END OF LIFE 
Mom, you are the best mom, and I love you. It’s OK for you to go because I 
don’t want you to be in pain. 
-Aubrey (Michelle Hargett-Beebee’s daughter moments after Michelle died)1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
By 2030, 20% of the United States population will be 65 or older.2 But 
death, dying, and chronic conditions are not just the purview of the old. 
Michelle Hargett-Beebee was just 43, a young mother, when she died of 
cancer in her home.3 Sons, daughters, mothers, fathers, and even siblings 
are more and more being called into the role of caregiver, their lives 
drastically affected by the dying process.4 
Palliative care, especially at the end of life, benefits both patients and 
their caregivers as they struggle with the difficult decisions brought on by 
chronic disease and terminal illness.5 Unfortunately, too few individuals are 
receiving appropriate palliative care.6 One key reason is that reimbursement 
methods have created perverse incentives for physicians and other 
professionals resulting in an arguable decline in quality of care and barriers 
to entry for patients.7 Additionally, effective patient-physician 
communication, vital to appropriate end-of-life care, rarely occurs.8 
 
 1. Bruce Newman, Life in a Year: Saying Goodbye to the Cycle of Life, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 25, 2009, 3:58 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/life-in-a-year/ci_14 
070282?nclick_check=1. 
 2. R. Sean Morrison & Diane E. Meier, Palliative Care, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2582, 
2582 (2004). 
 3. Newman, supra note 1. 
 4. See, e.g., NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING & AM. ASS’N OF RETIRED PERSONS, 
CAREGIVING IN THE U.S. 2009, at 4 (2009) (finding that about 29% of respondents or 
approximately 66 million people in the U.S. serve as caregivers). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part II. By “barriers of entry,” I mean both the for-profit tendency to cherry-
pick non-cancerous patients and those with dementia, the resulting long hospice length of stay 
(LOS), and physician fears that foster very short stays in hospice. 
 8. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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Advances in medical technology mean little if patients are left unaware of 
their benefits.9 The lack of satisfactory pain management is an especially 
disturbing area of this physician-patient disconnect.10 Individuals, such as 
members of Michelle Hargett-Beebee’s family,11 report seeing their loved 
ones dying in pain.12 
Two states, California and New York, have passed legislation,13 and 
others have considered legislation,14 creating either an active or conditional 
legal duty on the part of a physician to inform terminal patients or their 
caregivers of their rights at the end of life, including pain management. The 
statutes have different enforcement mechanisms. The California law 
supports a claim for reckless neglect under the state’s Elder and Dependent 
Adult Abuse statute.15 The more recent New York statute, as an act under 
the state’s Public Health Law, provides for fines and criminal penalties.16 
However, potential problems exist at the state level. New York and 
California have different triggers to the physician’s duty,17 varied 
approaches to elder abuse,18 and the California elder abuse statute has not 
yet been proven to protect all patients, just a specific class.19 Instead, 
Medicare’s Conditions of Participation20 should require hospitals to provide 
terminally ill patients and their families with information about the end of 
life.21 
Part II of this article describes the essential who, what, where, and how 
of palliative care and hospice, paying special attention to the rise of big 
business hospice and cost-of-care under Medicare.22 This section will also 
 
 9. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 10. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 11. Amended Complaint at 14, 17, 19, Hargett v. Vitas, No. RG10547255 (Cal. Super. 
July 6, 2011). 
 12. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 13. Right to Know End of Life Options Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5 (West 
2010); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2997-c (McKinney 2011). 
 14. See, e.g., H. 274, 2011-2012 Leg. Sess., (Vt. 2011); see e.g., S.B. 1311, 49th Leg., 
1st Reg. Sess. (Az. 2009). 
 15. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5. 
 16. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2997-c. 
 17. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §2997-c. 
 18. California addresses elder abuse civilly. Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil 
Protection Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 15600-15675 (West 2012). New York 
approaches elder abuse criminally. NY PENAL LAW § 120.05(12) (McKinney 2010). 
 19. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 15600-15675. 
 20. Medicare Conditions of Participation (COPs) are standards that a healthcare facility 
must meet in order to be eligible for Medicare reimbursement. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., 
HEALTH LAW 547-48 (2d ed. 2000). 
 21. See infra Part IV. 
 22. See infra Part II.A-B. 
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examine end-of-life communication breakdowns and inadequate pain 
management, all of which contribute to the broken promise of palliative 
care.23 Part III looks at how California and New York have approached 
these failures with differing state statutes and evaluates each of their 
shortcomings.24 Part IV suggests that a national standard in the form of 
Medicare Conditions of Participation be adopted.25 
II.  PALLIATIVE CARE AT THE END OF LIFE (SHHH. . . THAT’S H-O-S-P-I-C-E) 
The term “hospice” has become a dirty little word. Physicians admit they 
avoid the phrase because of its negative connotations.26 Like a plague, it 
causes them to run. Instead they suggest “palliative care” for the patient.27 
“Palliative care” does have a more benevolent tone. 28 It sounds caring.29 
Palliative care, from the Latin pallium, or cloak, offers patients symptom 
management and comfort, parallel to their curative treatment regimen.30 
However, palliative care when someone is terminally ill is H-O-S-P-I-C-E.31 
In an already emotional time, confusion about hospice and palliative 
care further muddies the waters. Therefore, this section first clarifies the field 
of “palliative care.”32 Then it defines and illuminates hospice explaining how 
hospice improves both patient and caregiver quality of life and reduces 
healthcare costs.33 Finally, the section concludes with how the promise of 
palliative care has been broken by a perverse reimbursement system, poor 
physician-patient communication, and inadequate pain management.34 
A. The Promise of Palliative Care 
“Palliative care is not just for the imminently dying . . . .”35 This common 
misconception often keeps patients from pursuing treatment.36 
 
 23. See infra Part II.B. 
 24. See infra Part III. 
 25. See infra Part IV. 
 26. William M. Lamers, Jr., Defining Hospice and Palliative Care: Some Further Thoughts, 
16 J. PAIN & PALLIATIVE CARE PHARMACOTHERAPY 65, 67 (2002). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 893 (2009); Lamers, supra note 26, at 
68. 
 31. See Kathy L. Cerminara, Hospice and Health Care Reform: Improving Care at the End 
of Life, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 443, 445 (2011). 
 32. See infra Part II.A. 
 33. See infra Part II.A. 
 34. See infra Part II.B. 
 35. J. Andrew Billings, What is Palliative Care?, 1 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 73, 77 (1998). 
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Unfortunately, the definition of palliative care can be confusing, not just for 
patients, but also for academics.37 The World Health Organization defines 
palliative care as, “an approach that improves the quality of life of patients 
and their families facing the problem associated with life-threatening illness, 
through the prevention and relief of suffering by means of early identification 
and impeccable assessment and treatment of pain and other problems, 
physical, psychosocial, and spiritual.”38 Several explanatory notes including 
one saying palliative care “provides relief from pain and other distressing 
symptoms” then follow this definition.39 Other scholars define palliative care 
as “specialized healthcare for anyone who is diagnosed with a serious and 
life-threatening illness, starting when they get the diagnosis, regardless of 
the prognosis.”40 A “disease . . . not responsive to curative treatment”41 or 
an illness “regardless of the prognosis”42 includes not only terminal illnesses 
but also chronic conditions such as heart disease, stroke, or chronic 
respiratory illnesses.43 
On a practical level, palliative care programs offer assistance with 
assessment and treatment of symptoms (including pain), support for 
decision-making, a fluid continuum of care, and aid to caregivers.44 A 
palliative care team is multidisciplinary and includes nurses, other medical 
professionals, and social workers.45 This team seeks to be involved in a 
patient’s life from the day of terminal diagnosis, or longer in the case of 
chronic illness.46 More than 80% of all large hospitals have such a 
program.47 
Similarly confusing is what hospice is and where it fits into this 
conversation. Hospice, a subset of palliative care, focuses the efforts 
 
 36. R. SEAN MORRISON, SYRACUSE UNIV. MAXWELL SCH. OF CITIZENSHIP & PUB. AFFAIRS, CTR 
FOR POLICY RESEARCH, POLICY BRIEF NO. 43/2010, PALLIATIVE CARE: A NOVEL SOLUTION TO THE 
HEALTHCARE CRISIS 1 (2010). 
 37. See Billings, supra note 35, at 73-74 (analyzing several different palliative care 
definitions and their impact on a potential patient). 
 38. WHO Definition of Palliative Care, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2013), http://www.who.int/ 
cancer/palliative/definition/en/. 
 39. Id. 
 40. MORRISON, supra note 36, at 1. 
 41. Billings, supra note 35, at 74. 
 42. MORRISON, supra note 36, at 1. 
 43. Chronic Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2013), http://www.who.int/topics/chronic_ 
diseases/en/. 
 44. Amy S. Kelley & Diane E. Meier, Editorial, Palliative Care—A Shifting Paradigm, 363 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 781, 781 (2010). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Billings, supra note 35, at 77. 
 47. Kelley & Meier, supra note 44, at 781. 
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outlined above on end-of-life care.48 From the Latin, hospes, meaning 
guest, hospice was originally provided in a facility.49 However, hospice 
currently refers to program of palliative care at the end of life provided in a 
multitude of settings, including the home.50 Legally, according to the 
Medicare hospice regulation, the term hospice means “a public agency or 
private organization or subdivision of either of these that is primarily 
engaged in providing hospice care” to terminally ill individuals.51 
Many Americans depend on hospice. Almost half of all deaths in the 
United States occur in a hospice program.52 Hospice patients are 
predominantly white,53 mostly female,54 and overwhelmingly old.55 That 
means more than 1.5 million people depend on hospice care in this country 
every year.56 Cancer for many years was the leading cause of hospice 
admission; now individuals in hospice are more likely to have dementia, 
heart disease, or lung disease.57 However, time in hospice can be short58 
with most patients using hospice only in their last weeks of life.59 
The value of palliative care, especially at the end of life, cannot be 
understated. Palliative care has been shown to increase quality of life for 
patients and caregivers, reduce healthcare costs, and help patients and 
families negotiate the healthcare system.60 The most surprising finding is that 
palliative care may actually extend the lives of terminally ill patients.61 For 
example, a recent study of lung cancer patients found that patients who 
 
 48. See Cerminara, supra note 31, at 445-46. 
 49. WILLIAM CHAMBERS, ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY 299 (A.M. MacDonald ed., 
1961); Lamers, supra note 26, at 68. 
 50. Lamers, supra note 26, at 69. 
 51. 42 C.F.R. § 418.3 (2011). 
 52. NAT’L HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., NHPCO FACTS AND FIGURES: HOSPICE CARE IN 
AMERICA 4 (2010). MedPAC reports similarly at 42% of all Medicare decedents. MEDICARE 
PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 265 
(2011), available at http://medpac.gov/documents/Mar11_EntireReport.pdf. 
 53. NAT’L HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., supra note 52, at 7 (80.5% of all Medicare 
hospice beneficiaries are white). 
 54. Id. at 6. (In 2009, 53.8% of all hospice patients were female). 
 55. Id. (83% of hospice patients are 65 plus with 38% reaching 85 or older. Individuals 
under the age of 34 account for just 0.8% of all hospice patients). 
 56. Id. at 4. 
 57. Id. at 7. (The top four reasons: “debility unspecified (13.1%), heart disease (11.5%), 
dementia (11.2%), and lung disease (8.2%).”). 
 58. NAT’L HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., supra note 52, at 5 (In 2009, the median 
length of stay was 21.1 days and the mean was 69.0 days. Although this appears to be long, 
the numbers are declining with the proportion of individuals staying more than 180 days 
decreasing from 12.1% in 2008 to 11.8% in 2009, a continuation of a several year trend). 
 59. Billings, supra note 35, at 77. 
 60. See MORRISON, supra note 36, at 1. 
 61. NAT’L HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., supra note 52, at 5. 
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entered palliative care early lived, on average, an additional two months.62 
Further, these patients experienced “clinically meaningful improvements in 
quality of life and mood.”63 
Not only patients but also families are affected by the decision to use a 
palliative care program. Up to 34 million households are impacted at any 
one time, each with at least one person spending on average 21 hours per 
week in the caregiver role.64 Caregiver quality of life improves when the 
patient elects palliative care.65 For example, Christakis and Iwashyna found 
that among individuals whose terminally ill spouse chose end-of-life 
palliation, fewer died within 18 months of the patient’s death.66 They 
suggest that even a short hospice stay, as brief as 3-4 weeks, may have a 
positive effect on the health status of the patient’s spouse.67 
Patients who enter palliative care programs at the end of their lives also 
cost less to care for. Terminal patients, such as those with cancer, tend to 
use more aggressive and costly treatments.68 Temel et al. suggest that entry 
into palliative care may reduce this societal and personal cost.69 Others 
claim that this is an oversimplification, noting that even when physicians 
know a patient’s needs, the patient tends to receive unwanted and expensive 
care.70 Instead, these critics argue that such cost savings can be attributed 
to the change in trajectory that a palliative care consultation creates in a 
systematic, “avert death at all costs” hospital environment.71 
Sadly, despite the promise of palliative care programs, evidence reveals 
that these programs are underused. Instead, patient distress, caregiver 
dissatisfaction, and overuse of costly and ineffective treatments are the 
norm.72 
 
 62. Jennifer S. Temel et al., Early Palliative Care for Patients with Metastatic Non-Small-
Cell Lung Cancer, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 733, 739 (2010). Temel et al. found that 54% of 
standard care patients and 34% of early palliative care patients received aggressive care. Id. 
at 738. Aggressive care was defined as either: chemotherapy within fourteen days before 
death, no hospice care, or admission to hospice three days or less before death. Id. at 735. 
 63. Id. at 739. 
 64. MORRISON, supra note 36, at 3. 
 65. See Nicholas A. Christakis & Theodore J. Iwashyna, The Health Impact of Health Care 
on Families: A Matched Cohort Study of Hospice Use by Decedents and Mortality Outcomes in 
Surviving, Widowed Spouses, 57 SOC. SCI. & MED. 465, 472 (2003). 
 66. Id. at 470. 
 67. Id. at 471. 
 68. Temel et al., supra note 62, at 740. 
 69. Id. 
 70. R. Sean Morrison et al., Cost Savings Associated with US Hospital Palliative Care 
Consultation Programs, 168 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1783, 1788 (2008). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Kelley & Meier, supra note 44, at 781; MORRISON, supra note 36, at 2-4. 
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B. The Broken Promise: Misaligned Incentives, Physician-Patient 
Communication Breakdown, and Inadequate Pain Management 
Palliative care can be a comfort for many.73 When it goes wrong, 
however, it is so much more than the simple misapplication of a program of 
care for the patients and caregivers involved. It can be horribly traumatizing 
to both. Imagine learning only days before your death that you had been 
terminally ill for much longer. You are stuck in a sterile hospital. Your family 
has been camped out at the ward instead of at home. When someone tells 
you, they fumble over the words or follow a script. They may even ask your 
family for your bed. You might be in pain, terrible pain. 
Death is a very personal experience. Unfortunately, medical 
professionals are failing at providing comfort during a patient’s end of life.74 
It is not all their fault. Medicare has created some perverse incentives that 
encourage the rise of for-profit hospice of questionable quality and either 
very long stays or very short stays.75 Without proper education about end-of-
life communication, fear and apprehension control these interactions, 
especially in the realm of pain management. 
This section will first examine the incentives of the Medicare hospice 
benefit.76 It will then discuss the breakdown in physician-patient 
communication at the end of life.77 Finally, this section will address the 
importance of adequate pain management.78 
1. Misaligned Incentives: The Medicare Hospice Benefit 
Palliative care treatment can be received concurrently with curative 
treatment.79 Payment for such treatment is treated like any other specialty 
until it crosses the line to become hospice, or end-stage palliative care.80 
Medical insurance companies and public payers (such as Medicare and 
Medicaid) reimburse for consultations, medication, and support services 
 
 73. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Hard Choice for Comfortable Death: Sedation, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/27/health/27sedation.html?page 
wanted=all. 
 74. See infra Part II.B.1-2. 
 75. Both have a negative impact. In the case of short stays, patients are not receiving the 
benefits of palliative care, as described in Part II.A, for, perhaps, as long as they could or 
would choose. Patients with very long hospice stays cost Medicare much more money. See 
infra Part II.B.1. 
 76. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 77. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 78. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 79. See supra Part II.A. 
 80. See, e.g., Charles F. Von Gunten et al., Coding and Reimbursement Mechanisms for 
Physician Services in Hospice and Palliative Care, 3 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 157, 158 (2000) 
(detailing the ways in which physicians are paid for both hospice and palliative care services). 
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dependent on their multitude of rules.81 How Medicare reimburses for 
palliative care treatment becomes important because of its enormous 
influence on both insurers and providers.82 The in-patient provision of 
palliative care is paid for under Medicare Part A.83 Medicare pays hospitals 
a Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) payment, essentially a flat fee, for each 
episode of patient care.84 Physicians who provide palliative care services are 
paid under Part B.85 Some physicians, specifically many hospitalists, are 
employed by hospitals and receive a salary or a salary with production 
bonuses.86 
The DRG system was established to incentivize reductions in hospital 
costs.87 If a hospital provides care to a patient at costs below the DRG 
payment, then it gets to keep the difference.88 Traditionally, hospitals have 
failed to see the promise of palliative care, especially for cutting costs.89 The 
old care paradigm was one where curative treatment was provided, without 
thought to palliative care consultation, until the last six months of life when 
the Medicare hospice benefit kicked into effect.90 More and more, hospitals 
are moving away from this old model to a new one where palliative care is 
 
 81. See, e.g., Steffie Woolhandler et al., Costs of Health Care Administration in the 
United States and Canada, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 768, 769 (2003) (comparing the 
healthcare administration costs between the U.S. and Canada). “Fragmentation also raises 
costs for providers who must deal with multiple insurance products – at least 755 in Seattle 
alone – forcing them to determine applicants’ eligibility and to keep track of the various 
copayments, referral networks, and approval requirements.” Id. at 773. 
 82. Although limited in its scope by eligibility requirements, Medicare pays a large 
proportion of medical costs given its target population. FURROW ET AL., supra note 20, at 538. 
 83. As mentioned above, palliative care teams usually include nurses, social workers, and 
medical professionals. See supra Part II.A. Nurses and social workers are employed by the 
hospital and their services are paid under Medicare. 42 C.F.R. § 409.10(a)(2) (2011) 
(expanded upon in 42 C.F.R. § 409.12 (2011)). As for medical professionals, see infra note 
86. 
 84. 42 C.F.R. § 412.2(a) (2011) (defining the prospective payment system); 42 C.F.R. § 
412.4(c)-(d) (2011) (explaining DRGs and defining “postacute care transfers”). 
 85. Participating physicians are paid by multiplying the Relative Value Unit (RVU) by the 
Geographic Adjustment Factor (GAF) by the Conversion Factor (CF). 42 C.F.R. § 414.20 
(2011). Medicare then pays the physician the lesser of this value (the fee schedule amount) or 
her actual charge. 42 C.F.R. § 414.21 (2011). RVUs are established by CMS for a physician’s 
work. 42 C.F.R. § 414.22 (2011). 
 86. Joseph Ming Wah Li, Society of Hospital Medicine (SHM) 2007-2008 Productivity and 
Compensation Survey, MEDSCAPE INTERNAL MED. (July 29, 2008), http://www.medscape.org/ 
viewarticle/578134. In 2008, 40% of hospitalists were employed by hospitals and 24% were 
employed by academic institutions. Id. 
 87. FURROW ET AL., supra note 20, at 552. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See generally Morrison et al., supra note 70 (comparing costs per admission between 
palliative and “usual care” patients). 
 90. MORRISON, supra note 36, at 9 fig.2. 
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provided throughout the course of treatment for a chronic or life-threatening 
illness,91 perhaps recognizing not just its benefit for patients but also, their 
bottom line.92 
Once a patient qualifies for hospice care, their treatment is no longer 
paid for under the DRG system.93 Payment for hospice differs from that of 
palliative care because Medicare has some strict requirements for 
qualification.94 To be eligible to receive Medicare hospice benefits a patient 
must have only six months left to live, as determined by a physician, and 
must abandon curative treatment.95 Medicare has covered hospice since 
1982.96 Since then, it has become the primary source of payment for 
hospice services97 and covers the most patient days in hospice.98 
In addition to reinforcing an outdated treatment model, the Medicare 
hospice benefit, as the dominant payer in the market, has led to misaligned 
incentives. The Medicare benefit has been shown to “scare off” physicians 
and patients at the end of life, resulting in shorter stays generally. The 
exacting requirements of Medicare have led hospice providers to be 
cautious in admission and reevaluation of patients.99 Hospice has become a 
place for the imminently dying.100 Even though patient days increased from 
54 to 86 days between 2000 and 2009, this change reflects an increase in 
the number of long stays, not the median length of stay.101 In fact, the 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Diane E. Meier, The Development, Status, and Future of Palliative Care, in PALLIATIVE 
CARE: TRANSFORMING THE CARE OF SERIOUS ILLNESS 3, 54 (eds. Diane E. Meier et al., 2010). 
 93. 42 C.F.R. § 418.302 (2011). 
 94. Billings, supra note 35, at 76. 
 95. Id. Note that hospice programs are required to certify and recertify at the 60 and 90 
day marks. Stephen R. Connor, U.S. Hospice Benefits, 38 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 105, 
105 (2009). For an overview of the hospice benefit see David E. Thiess, The Medicare 
Hospice Benefit After Health Reform: Cost Controls, Expanded Access, and System-Induced 
Pressures, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 39, 43-46 (2010). 
 96. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, § 121, 96 Stat. 
324, 356 (1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1395d (2012)). Although the act had a 
1986 sunset provision, that year Congress made the program permanent. Id. 
 97. NAT’L HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., supra note 52, at 10 (83.4% of hospice 
patients are covered by Medicare). MedPAC supports this finding: “In 2009, nearly 1.1 million 
Medicare beneficiaries received hospice services from nearly 3,500 providers, and Medicare 
expenditures totaled $12 billion.” MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 52, at 
259. 
 98. NAT’L HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., supra note 52, at 10 (89% of hospice patient 
days are covered by Medicare). 
 99. Billings, supra note 35, at 76. 
 100. Id. at 77 (most patients use hospice at the very end of life, usually in just the last 
weeks). 
 101. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 52, at 269. 
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number of short stays has remained steady with a median of 17 days.102 
Further, the lowest 25% has actually decreased from an average stay of 6 
days to just 5 days.103 The same pattern is seen at nonprofit and for-profit 
hospices.104 
The Medicare hospice benefit has likely led to an increase in the number 
of for-profit hospices. Entrepreneurs lobbied for the hospice benefit because 
they saw a business opportunity.105 Hospices receive a per diem rate for 
services based on the location and level of care.106 They receive this daily 
payment no matter how many services they provide.107 Although an 
individual hospice is limited in the amount of Medicare payments it can 
receive each year,108 this does not appear to have significantly retarded the 
for-profit hospice industry’s growth.109 In fact, the growth of the for-profit 
hospice industry has been enormous: between 1992 and 1999, for-profit 
hospice centers increased by 300%110 and an additional 142% between 
2000 and 2009.111 
Such significant increases have led researchers to ask whether for-profit 
status affects quality of care.112 Whereas nonprofit hospice has emerged 
from a care tradition with an emphasis on “psychosocial support, spiritual 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. MedPAC attributes the short stays to factors other than the Medicare benefit 
including reluctance on the part of physicians and family member to admit a patient to 
hospice and patient unwillingness to forego curative treatment. Id. Ironically, these two issues 
could be seen as stemming from the Medicare benefit’s exacting requirements that a physician 
certify a patient has less than six months to live and that a patient forego curative treatment for 
eligibility. Id. 
 104. Melissa D. A. Carlson et al., Ownership Status and Patterns of Care in Hospice, 
Results from the National Home and Hospice Care Survey, 42 MED. CARE 432, 437 (2004) 
(finding, in their study, no difference of the length of stay between for-profit and non-profit 
hospice). 
 105. Joshua E. Perry & Robert C. Stone, In the Business of Dying: Questioning the 
Commercialization of Hospice, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 224, 227 (2011). 
 106. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 52, at 262. The four levels of care 
and payment are: Routine Home Care ($147/day), Continuous Home Care ($35.66/hour), 
Inpatient Respite Care ($152/day), and General Inpatient Care ($652/day). Id. 
 107. Perry & Stone, supra note 105, at 227. 
 108. The only significant financial constraint on hospice expenditure growth, the cap 
requires hospices to repay Medicare for any payments received above the total number of 
Medicare patients electing hospice in their program times a set cap amount. In 2008, the cap 
amount was $22,386.15. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 52, at 264. 
 109. In 2008, 10% of hospices were exceeding the cap. Id. at 271. The number of 
hospices who exceed the cap tends to be low, however, MedPAC notes that as the length of 
stay for the very long group increases, more hospices are exceeding the cap. Id. at 264. 
 110. Carlson et al., supra note 104, at 432. 
 111. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 52, at 267. 
 112. Carlson et al., supra note 104, at 432. 
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care, the use of volunteers and family, and symptom management,” for-
profit care may not have the same foundation and therefore, may lack 
quality.113 However, studies have been rare and inconsistent.114 One 2004 
study did conclude that patients in for-profit hospice were receiving fewer 
non-core services than patients in nonprofit hospice settings.115 Others have 
shown that in a for-profit facility, there is less skilled nursing care116 and 
fewer interdisciplinary staff.117 
Next, evidence suggests that hospices may be “cherry-picking” 
residents.118 Cherry-picking refers to the practice of choosing only those 
most desirable patients.119 For instance, the Medicare benefit’s per diem 
structure incentivizes recruiting patients likely to live longer while needing 
fewer services.120 According to MedPAC, very long stays have grown from 
an average of 141 days to an average of 237 days.121 Although 
“counterintuitive,” longer stays actually are more profitable because of the 
U-shaped curve of the cost of providing hospice care.122 Patients tend to be 
more expensive at the beginning of their stay as they are acclimated to the 
hospice program, and at the end of their stay as more care is needed for 
comfort in the dying process, leaving a middle area (at the bottom of the U) 
where patients cost less.123 Therefore, the longer a patient stays in hospice 
care, the longer the period of profit at the bottom of the U-curve.124 
This is a particularly troublesome problem in the for-profit setting. 
Lengths of stay are about 45% longer in for-profit hospice than in nonprofit 
 
 113. Id. at 437. 
 114. Only two studies in the field had been performed as of 2004: One finding that for-
profit centers provided more bereavement services, the other finding no significant difference 
between for-profit and nonprofit care in terms of treatment hours or number of patient 
services. Id. at 432. 
 115. Id. at 435. Core services must be provided by the hospice organization at all times. 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL 40.4 (2012). Core 
services are: physician services, nursing services, medical social services, and counseling, 
including bereavement. Id. Non-core services must be provided to meet the patients’ and 
families’ needs. Id. at 40.5. They are: physical, occupational, and speech therapies, hospice 
aide services, homemaker services, volunteers, medical supplies including drugs and durable 
medical equipment, and short-term inpatient care. Id. 
 116. Perry & Stone, supra note 105, at 230. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. at 228. 
 119. Stephanie Bouchard, Concerns Raised About Increase in For-Profit Hospice Care, 
HEALTHCARE FIN. NEWS (May 26, 2011), http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/con 
cerns-raised-about-increase-profit-hospice-care. 
 120. Perry & Stone, supra note 105, at 229. 
 121. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 52, at 269. 
 122. Perry & Stone, supra note 105, at 228. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 228-29. 
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hospice.125 Furthermore, patients in for-profit hospices are more likely to 
stay longer than a year in hospice.126 The fact that for-profit hospice tends to 
generate more revenue than nonprofit hospice can be attributed to cherry-
picking longer-stay patients.127 
An extension of this analysis provides an explanation for for-profit 
hospices’ exclusion of cancerous patients, perhaps this rationale’s most 
detrimental effect.128 Wachterman et al. suggest: 
under [the Medicare hospice per diem payment system], profit can be 
maximized by caring for patients with certain diagnoses that require fewer 
skilled services, patients residing in nursing homes, or patients with longer 
hospice stays.129 
Their study found that not only were for-profit hospices selecting non-
cancerous patients, but also were specifically selecting dementia patients.130 
Therefore, two-thirds of for-profit hospice patients were diagnosed with 
dementia and had non-cancerous conditions whereas only one-half of 
nonprofit hospice patients have similar diagnoses.131 Further, dementia 
patients have significantly longer stays than all other patient types.132 
 
 125. Id. at 228. Additionally patients stayed on average four days longer in for-profit 
hospice. Melissa W. Wachterman et al., Association of Hospice Agency Profit Status With 
Patient Diagnosis, Location of Care, and Length of Stay, 305 JAMA 472, 475 (2011). 
 126. Wachterman et al., supra note 125, at 476. 
 127. Perry & Stone, supra note 105, at 225. In fact, Vitas, the largest for-profit hospice 
provider in the nation, sends recruiters to nursing homes to select and influence residents. Id. 
at 228. 
 128. Id. at 229 (suggesting that dominant for-profit systems would push more costly 
patients, cancerous patients, off on hospices “with a broader commitment to a community”). 
What makes this so detrimental is that hospice’s origins stem from its work with cancer 
patients. For a quick and dirty history of hospice, see History of Hospice Care, NAT’L HOSPICE 
& PALLIATIVE CARE ORG. (May 17, 2012), http://www.nhpco.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid 
=3285. 
 129. Wachterman et al., supra note 125, at 477. 
 130. For-profit hospices had 34.1% cancer patients as compared with 48.4% for nonprofit 
hospices. Id. Further, for profit had 17.2% of patients with dementia as compared with 8.4% 
and more patients with other diagnoses (48.7% v. 43.2%). Id. at 475. The National Hospice 
Organization (NHO) has issued physician certification standards for dementia: “Hospice 
criteria for dementia include: (1) dementia of sufficient severity and (2) the first occurrence of 
medical complications.” Brad Stuart, The NHO Medical Guidelines for Non-Cancer Disease 
and Local Medical Review Policy: Hospice Access for Patients with Diseases Other Than 
Cancer, 14 HOSPICE J., no. 3/4, 1999, at 139, 146. However, even when following these 
guidelines, physician certification of non-cancerous patients is unreliable. For example, in 
Alzheimer’s patients, with an unpredictable disease trajectory, only 30% of those certified died 
within 6 months of certification. Kiran Joshi et al., How Do We Decide When a Patient with 
Nonmalignant Disease is Eligible for Hospice Care?, 55 CLINICAL INQUIRIES 525, 529 (2006). 
 131. Wachterman et al., supra note 125, at 477. 
 132. Id. at 476. 
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Therefore, despite the proven value of palliative care, especially at the 
end of life in the form of hospice, palliative care’s promise has been broken. 
The negative incentives of the Medicare hospice payment structure have led 
to a rise in for-profit hospice, perhaps lower quality of care, and either very 
long stays or very short stays. 
2. Physician-Patient Communication Breakdown 
Physician-patient end-of-life communication is absolutely necessary.133 It 
helps physicians and patients work together to establish effective treatment 
plans.134 Those who speak with their physician about end-of-life care are 
more likely to choose less aggressive treatment, to die at home or in 
hospice, and to have their treatment preferences followed.135 As previously 
stated, patients who chose less aggressive treatment are more likely to have 
a better quality of life and are more likely to live longer.136 Failure to 
adequately communicate negatively affects the quality of palliative care137 
as well as patient and caregiver satisfaction.138 Further, inappropriate 
communication can traumatize the patient or the caregiver139 and affect the 
patient’s ability to adjust psychologically.140 
The principles of effective end-of-life communication are well 
established and an open conversation should occur as early as possible. For 
example, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) has published guidelines for 
communicating a bad prognosis to a patient.141 Generally, the IOM advises 
providers “to ask, not assume: to ask patients what they want to know, to 
suggest questions that patients might have” with attention to cultural 
sensitivities.142 The IOM also recommends that the end-of-life conversation 
 
 133. Ebun Abarshi et al., Discussing End-of-Life Issues in the Last Months of Life: A 
Nationwide Study Among General Practitioners, 14 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 323, 323 (2011). 
 134. See id. 
 135. Jennifer W. Mack et al., End-of-Life Care Discussions Among Patients With Advanced 
Cancer, 156 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 204, 204 (2012). 
 136. Id. at 204, 207. 
 137. Abarshi et al., supra note 133, at 323. 
 138. Michelle N. Grainger et al., Discussing the Transition to Palliative Care: Evaluation of 
a Brief Communication Skills Training Program for Oncology Clinicians, 8 PALLIATIVE & 
SUPPORTIVE CARE 441, 442 (2010). 
 139. COMM. ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, INST. OF MED., APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING 
CARE AT THE END OF LIFE 61 (Marilyn J. Field & Christine K. Cassel eds., 1997). 
 140. Grainger et al., supra note 138, at 442. 
 141. See COMM. ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, INST. OF MED., supra note 139, at 62-63. 
 142. Id. at 64. An end-of-life conversation can be especially challenging in different 
cultural contexts. See, e.g., Alina M. Perez & Kathy L. Cerminara, La Caja de Pandora: 
Improving Access to Hospice Care Among Hispanic and African-American Patients, 10 HOUS. 
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 255, 257 (2010). 
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should occur early in the disease trajectory.143 Similarly, national standards 
for patients with incurable cancer recommend that these conversations 
occur when a patient’s life expectancy falls to within one year.144 
Unfortunately, despite established guidelines, these discussions are not 
occurring and when they are, they take place in the hospital, very shortly 
before a patient’s death, and are not always effective. Some studies report 
that fewer than 40% of patients with advanced cancer are having end-of-life 
discussions with their physicians.145 When they do occur, they take place, on 
average, just a month prior to death in the hospital setting.146 Even when a 
physician shares information with a patient, there is no guarantee the 
information has been understood.147 For example, one study of 
communication in the intensive care unit (ICU) found that patients’ families 
left almost half the time feeling as though there had been a conflict with the 
ICU staff.148 One especially disturbing example of such poor 
communication included in the report was that of “physicians saying that 
another patient needed the dying patient’s bed.”149 
Physicians acknowledge that these discussions at the end of a patient’s 
life cause uncertainty and apprehension.150 Emotionally, the physician may 
feel helpless or like she is failing the patient.151 Their education may not 
adequately prepare them for this experience. Despite the increase in 
medical school coursework hours devoted to palliative care and 
communication, most hours are spent in so-called “patient-interviewing 
courses,” considered to have the “least effect on [a] medical student’s 
competency.”152 Further, in the so-called “hidden curriculum,” physicians 
may be taught to be dismissive or even avoidant of palliative care.153 
 
 143. See e.g., Grainger et al., supra note 138, at 441. 
 144. Mack et al., supra note 135, at 204. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 207. Mack et al. found that end-of-life conversations occurred 87% of the time 
but only within a month of death. Id. 
 147. COMM. ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, INST. OF MED., supra note 139, at 63. 
 148. Tomer T. Levin et al., End-of-Life Communication in the Intensive Care Unit, 32 GEN. 
HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 433, 433 (2010). 
 149. Id. at 434. 
 150. COMM. ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, INST. OF MED., supra note 139, at 61. 
 151. Grainger et al., supra note 138, at 441. 
 152. Joy Goldsmith et al., Palliative Care Communication Curriculum: What Can Students 
Learn from an Unfolding Case?, 28 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 236, 236 (2011). 
 153. Id. “Although a student can be prepared for excellent communication, collaboration, 
empathy, and patient centered attitudes through years of formal training, just a few minutes in 
a work environment that does not model these behaviors will rapidly lead to their extinction in 
the student’s behaviors.” Brian David Hodges & Ayelet Kuper, Theory and Practice in the 
Design and Conduct of Graduate Medical Education, 87 ACAD. MED. 25, 30 (2012) 
(explaining a medical student’s exposure to the “hidden curriculum”). 
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Communication between a physician and his patient, or the patient’s 
caregiver, is vital at the end of life. However, evidence shows that when 
these conversations occur, many times they happen too late for the patient 
to access the promise of palliative care. 
3. Inadequate Pain Management 
Pain is defined as “an unpleasant sensation occurring in varying degrees 
of severity as a consequence of injury, disease or emotional disorder.”154 
Pain management is “a comprehensive approach to the needs of 
patients . . . who experience problems associated with acute or chronic 
pain.”155 Approximately 116 million people currently suffer from a chronic 
pain condition and pain costs our country at least $560 billion a year in 
economic losses.156 As one advocate puts it, pain is more than just the 
sensation: 
It is so much more than just pain intensity. Over time, many [patients] find 
the effects of living with chronic pain impact their ability to work, engage in 
recreational and social activities, and for some, [perform] the most basic 
everyday activities that people just take for granted. Not surprisingly, pain 
begins to chip away at their mood, often leaving them angry, frustrated, 
anxious, and/or depressed. Our families suffer along with us, and many 
relationships are forever altered.157 
Although most pain can be treated, healthcare providers do not have a 
strong track record in this area.158 For example, the SUPPORT study found 
that 50% of people experienced pain even after a week of hospitalization.159 
Another study showed results as high as 79% of their survey group 
experiencing pain after seven days of hospitalization.160 One explanation for 
 
 154. STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1282 (26th ed. 1995). 
 155. Barry R. Furrow, Pain Management and Provider Liability: No More Excuses, 29 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 28, 29 (2001). 
 156. COMM. ON ADVANCING PAIN RESEARCH, CARE, & EDUC. INST. OF MED., RELIEVING PAIN 
IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING PREVENTION, CARE, EDUCATION, AND RESEARCH 1 
(2011). 
 157. Id. at 24. 
 158. Furrow, supra note 155, at 28. In fact, there is “strong consensus” that 90% of all 
pain can be treated. Ben A. Rich, A Prescription for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care 
for Pain Management, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 8 (2000). 
 159. Norman A. Desbiens et al., Pain and Satisfaction with Pain Control in Seriously Ill 
Hospitalized Adults: Findings from the SUPPORT Research Investigations, 24 CRITICAL CARE 
MED. 1953, 1954, 1959 (1996); MORRISON, supra note 36, at 3. The SUPPORT study 
evaluated the decision-making process in nine high mortality diseases: acute respiratory 
failure; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; congestive heart failure; chronic liver failure; 
nontraumatic coma; metastatic colon cancer; advanced non-small cell lung cancer; multiple 
organ system failure with malignancy; and sepsis. Desbiens et al., supra, at 1954. 
 160. Desbiens et al., supra note 159, at 1959. 
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these differing results is that pain intensity can vary among disease types.161 
The SUPPORT study concluded that those with colon cancer reported more 
pain than patients with other disease types.162 Cancer patients, therefore, 
may have different pain medication needs than those with other illnesses.163 
The wide variance of pain experiences among patients and its clear 
undertreatment underscore the importance of asking patients about their 
pain.164 
Various (mis?)perceptions cause physicians to under-prescribe. Many 
are the result of a lack of both physician and patient education in this 
area.165 Physician pain management training is woefully inadequate,166 and 
perhaps this leads to patients receiving little or no information about 
medication.167 Both physician and patient fears, often unfounded, lead to 
under-prescription. Physicians’ fear of legal action and avoidance of 
regulatory scrutiny are most commonly attributed to inadequate pain 
management.168 Physicians also worry about patient addiction.169 Similarly, 
patients’ own fears of addiction may contribute to this misperception.170 
In the case of palliative sedation, an important form of pain 
management at the end of life, additional ethical factors may contribute to 
underprescription. Palliative sedation is the last, and usually the only, option 
for individuals who have no alternatives to treat their pain.171 Under 
palliative sedation, a patient can be rendered completely unconscious.172 
The scientific community continues to debate when sedation is 
appropriate.173 Of specific concern is how close to death a patient needs to 
be in order to receive this treatment.174 Some physicians argue that the line 
 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 1960. 
 165. See Rima J. Oken, Curing Healthcare Providers’ Failure to Administer Opioids in the 
Treatment of Severe Pain, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1917, 1933 (2002). 
 166. Id. Oken notes that many medical schools offer pain management as a portion of 
another course, likely taught by someone without experience in palliative care. Id. at 1933-
34. 
 167. See Furrow, supra note 155, at 28. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Rich, supra note 158, at 8. Especially in rural America, these fears may not be 
unfounded. See David L. Robinson, Bridging the Gaps: Improved Legislation to Prohibit the 
Abuse of Prescription Drugs in Virginia, 9 APPALACHIAN J.L. 281, 281 (2010). 
 170. Furrow, supra note 155, at 28. 
 171. Jeffrey T. Berger, Rethinking Guidelines for the Use of Palliative Sedation, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., May-June 2010, at 32, 33. 
 172. Id. at 32-33. 
 173. Id. at 33. 
 174. Id. 
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should be drawn at mere hours from death, while others suggest that 
palliative sedation should be available to the patient at the point of terminal 
diagnosis.175 A great deal of this concern stems from the fact that palliative 
sedation can hasten a person’s death.176 However, palliative sedation is 
recognized as a patient’s right even if it does accelerate death177 and most 
individuals under palliative sedation die from the underlying illness, not the 
medication.178 
In addition to palliative sedation, many times caregivers must also 
decide whether to provide nutrition, contributing to the fundamental ethical 
dilemma. Consider the case of Mr. Oltzik, 88 years old, diagnosed with 
dementia, congestive heart failure, and kidney problems.179 His wife and 
son could no longer take care of him at home because of his erratic 
behavior.180 Once in the hospice center, physicians, with the support of his 
family, decided to provide his pain medication intravenously.181 His erratic 
behavior stopped and Mr. Oltzik appeared at peace.182 In addition to the 
decision to sedate her husband, Mrs. Oltzik had to also decide whether to 
provide her husband, unable to swallow, nutrition and hydration through a 
tube.183 Ultimately his wife decided against insertion of a tube.184 
Much of the conversation had proceeded not in black and white like a legal 
document, but in shades of gray. By the end, they all seemed to understand 
one another, though ultimately Mrs. Oltzik would express some sadness at 
being unable to interact with her husband.185 
These decisions do indeed occur in shades of gray and only a physician 
appropriately educated in end-of-life issues can aptly guide families through 
a situation such as that of Mr. Oltzik and his family. 
Physician and patient misperceptions, often born through a lack of 
education, can negatively impact an already difficult, multilayered, ethical 
decision to provide palliative sedation at the end of life. Therefore, despite 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. Berger, supra 171, at 32. Palliative sedation is distinguished from active euthanasia, 
however, because the treating physician’s goal is to treat pain, not to kill the patient, an 
ethical phenomenon known as “double effect.” Id. at 33-34. 
 177. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737-38 (1997) (O’Conner, J., 
concurring) (“There is no dispute that dying patients in Washington and New York can obtain 
palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their deaths.”). 
 178. Berger, supra note 171, at 33. 
 179. Hartocollis, supra note 73. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Hartocollis, supra note 73. 
 185. Id. 
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the proven value of palliative care, the promise has been broken. Evidence 
suggests a rise in for-profit hospice, questionable quality of care, and very 
long stays or very short stays. Further complicating the picture is the 
breakdown of patient-physician communication and inadequate pain 
management at the end of life. 
III.  STATE-LEVEL ATTEMPTS & FAILURES 
Unfortunately, the United States’ healthcare system faces many 
challenges at the end of life. The fault lies not only with Medicare’s 
incentives for for-profit hospice centers to cherry-pick residents and provide 
questionable quality care, but also with physicians. At the root of good 
patient care at the end of life is the physician-patient relationship. However, 
when communication lines falter or fail, inadequate pain management and 
other important patient needs go unattended. First, Part A will address two 
attempts at solving this problem: California’s Right to Know End-of-Life 
Options Act186 and New York’s new 2011 statute.187 Then Part B will discuss 
why a state level solution is not viable. 
A. Two Attempts: California and New York Tackle Physician-Patient 
Communication at the End of Life 
California and New York have tackled failures in patient-physician 
communication at the end of life by enacting legislation requiring physicians 
to communicate with patients or family members about end-of-life treatment 
decisions.188 Called “right-to-know” laws,189 both statutes focus on 
informing a patient of all available treatments at the end of life. However, 
they differ in several respects, including the duty they require of the 
physician, their approach to penalties and fines, and their potential role in 
litigation.190 This section will first address California’s elder abuse framework 
and then New York’s use of its established public health laws. 
1. California’s Approach 
This humane and compassionate legislation will assure those suffering at the 
end of their lives are provided full and accurate information about their 
 
 186. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5 (West 2010). 
 187. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2997-c (McKinney 2011). 
 188. Right to Know End of Life Options Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5 (West 
2010); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § Right to Know End of Life Options Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 442; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §2997-c. 
 189. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Health Law and the Elderly: Managing Risk at the End of Life: 
An Introduction to the Symposium, 17 WIDENER L. REV. i, viii (2011). 
 190. See infra Part III.B. 
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treatment and pain management options — Assemblymember Lloyd Levine 
(speaking about the California Right to Know End-of-Life Options Act)191 
In 2008, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law 
the Right to Know End-of-Life Options Act (Right to Know Act).192 Advocates 
saw this as a victory for patients, while medical professionals scoffed at the 
legislature’s interference into their realm.193 A question remains as to how 
important this law has been and how legal professionals can use it to 
support their clients. First this section will review the Right to Know Act, 
paying specific attention to the battle to get it passed in its current form, the 
language with some of its noticeable flaws, and the continued debate over 
its intrusion into the physician-patient relationship. The next part will address 
the legal implications of the statute as exemplified by the current litigation — 
Hargett v. Vitas.194 
a. California’s Right to Know Statute 
The Right to Know Act grew from a legislative effort to recognize the 
importance of hospice and palliative care, that too few Californians were 
receiving hospice care, and the dangers surrounding the breakdown of 
communication between physician and patient. Its narrow approval perhaps 
reflects negative legislative and public opinion of previous end-of-life 
measures.195 In prior years, more expansive legislation allowed Californians 
to request medication to “provide comfort with an assurance of peaceful 
dying if suffering becomes unbearable.”196 Earlier versions of the Right to 
Know Act included more specific information about voluntarily stopping 
eating and drinking (VSED) as well as about palliative sedation.197 
 
 191. Frank D. Russo, California Assembly Approves Right to Know End-of-Life Options Act, 
CAL. PROGRESS REPORT (May 30, 2008), http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/califor 
nia-assembly-approves-right-know-end-life-options-act. 
 192. A.B. 2747, 2007-2008 Leg., (Cal. 2008), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/ 
pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_2701-2750/ab_2747_bill_20080930_chaptered.pdf (Gov. 
Schwarzenegger signed the bill into law on Sept. 30, 2008). 
 193. Kevin B. O’Reilly, California Law Mandates Discussing End-of-Life Options, AM. MED. 
NEWS (Nov. 10, 2008), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/11/10/prsc1110.htm. 
 194. Initial Complaint, Hargett v. Vitas, No. RG10547255 (Cal. Super. Nov. 18, 2010). 
 195. The vote was 42-34 with all the Republican House members, joined by two 
Democrats, voting against the measure. Russo, supra note 191. 
 196. The California Compassionate Choices Act (A.B. 651, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2005)) was reintroduced in the next legislative term (A.B. 374, 2007-2008 Leg., (Cal. 
2007)). Interestingly, a majority of Californians supported the bill. Russo, supra note 191. 
 197. Ben A. Rich, Legislating Patient-Care Protocols, UC DAVIS HEALTH SYSTEM (2012), 
http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/welcome/features/20090513_Medicine_Rich/index.html 
[hereinafter Rich, Legislating Patient-Care Protocols]. Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking 
(VSED) is a method of hastening death when a patient chooses to not accept hydration or 
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Legislators on the floor had to distinguish the Right to Know Act from these 
previous attempts at passing end-of-life measures and versions of the bill in 
order to get it passed.198 One commentator noted that this was in fact a 
“modest measure dealing only with a patient’s right to be informed.”199 
The first of its kind,200 the statute requires a healthcare provider, when 
she makes a terminal diagnosis, to, “upon a patient’s request, provide the 
patient with comprehensive information and counseling regarding legal 
end-of-life care options.”201 This includes information about: 
The patient’s right to comprehensive pain and symptom management at the 
end of life, including, but not limited to, adequate pain medication, 
treatment of nausea, palliative chemotherapy, relief of shortness of breath 
and fatigue, and other clinical treatments useful when a patient is actively 
dying.202 
Physicians may still inform patients about VSED and palliative sedation but 
such language was not included in the final version of the bill.203 
Similar to the Medicare hospice benefit, timing is at issue in the Right to 
Know Act. The Right to Know Act fails to explicitly define “terminal 
illness.”204 A different section of the welfare act defines “terminal disease” as 
“a medical condition resulting in a prognosis of life of one year or less, if 
the disease follows its natural course.”205 Assuming that this language is 
applicable, physicians are given more time than with the Medicare hospice 
benefit.206 However, similar to the Medicare benefit, such timelines create a 
lot of uncertainty on the part of the physician.207 Patient advocates are also 
concerned that the act does not offer sufficient leeway for individuals who 
have “‘seriously compromised and declining health,’ or those who are 
chronically ill, frail and ‘at high risk of dying at a time uncertain.’”208 
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 199. Id. 
 200. O’Reilly, supra note 193. 
 201. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5 (West 2010). 
 202. Id. § 442.5(a)(5). 
 203. O’Reilly, supra note 193. The law requires that healthcare providers “provide the 
patient with comprehensive information” which may include VSED and palliative sedation. Id.; 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5. 
 204. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442. 
 205. Id. § 1746(i). 
 206. 42 C.F.R. § 418.20 (2011); Billings, supra note 35, at 76. 
 207. Billings, supra note 35, at 76. 
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the End-of-Life, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 387, 434 (2009). 
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Despite the California Medical Association’s (CMA) support for the 
measure,209 physicians still express concern that the law “unduly interferes 
with the physician-patient relationship.”210 Specifically, they argue that such 
legislation may result in “information dumping.”211 Such information 
overload, physicians fear, would preclude them from having detailed 
conversations with patients at the appropriate times.212 Supporters argue 
that they “‘don’t think physicians need to be afraid of overwhelming patients 
with too much information when they are following the patients’ lead.’”213 
Although contentious and flawed, the Right to Know Act is California’s 
attempt at a solution to the physician-patient communication conundrum. 
The next section will address how it might be used in litigation to affect 
change. 
b. Right to Know Act Meets Elder Abuse Litigation, a Legal Solution? 
Carol Hargett realized that her daughter, Michelle Hargett-Beebee, had 
died when she heard her moans stop.214 Michelle, a young mother, had 
died agonizingly in the care of a large for-profit hospice, Vitas.215 The 
hospice staff was aware from early on that Ms. Hargett-Beebee was 
suffering and failed to adequately address her pain.216 In 2010, 
Compassion & Choices filed suit against Vitas under an elder abuse 
theory.217 In this case, however, the plaintiffs had a new weapon to add to 
their elder abuse allegations: California’s Right to Know End-of-Life Options 
Act (Right to Know Act).218 
Although bringing an elder abuse claim given Michelle’s age of 43 may 
seem unusual,219 California’s response to inadequate pain management 
 
 209. Rich, Legislating Patient-Care Protocols, supra note 197. 
 210. O’Reilly, supra note 193. 
 211. Rich, Legislating Patient-Care Protocols, supra note 197. 
 212. Id. 
 213. O’Reilly, supra note 193 (quoting Barbara Combs Lee, president of Compassion & 
Choices). 
 214. A Death, a Tragedy, a Ground-Breaking Lawsuit, COMPASSION & CHOICES, http://com 
munity.compassionandchoices.org/page.aspx?pid=482 (last visited Nov. 28, 2012) 
[hereinafter A Death, a Tragedy, a Ground-Breaking Lawsuit]. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 16. 
 218. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5 (West 2010); Amended Complaint, supra note 
11, at 20. 
 219. Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 3. See ELDER ABUSE FORENSIC CTR., APS 
STATISTICS AND 2005 CLIENT PROFILES (2005), available at http://www.elderabuseforensiccen 
ter.com/pdf/eafc_elderabusereports.pdf (30% of reported adult abuse cases in 2005 were for 
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has been to bring causes of action under the state’s elder abuse statute.220 
Attorneys pursue this route for several reasons. First, despite a push to hold 
physicians accountable under medical malpractice, such attempts have 
been largely unsuccessful given the disparate standards for pain 
management.221 Further, in California’s case, there is a cap on medical 
malpractice damages, making this route unattractive.222 On the other hand, 
in an action for elder abuse, if the physician acted with recklessness, 
oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff can recover compensatory 
damages, attorney fees and costs, and damages for the decedent’s pain 
and suffering.223 
To be found liable under an elder abuse claim, the plaintiff must prove 
neglect or physical abuse of an elder or vulnerable dependent.224 Relevant 
in this discussion, neglect is defined as: 
The negligent failure of any person having the care or custody of an elder or 
a dependent adult to exercise that degree of care that a reasonable person 
in a like position would exercise.225 
In order to qualify for heightened remedies, one must also be found guilty of 
“recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice.”226 Recklessness is defined as a 
“subjective state of culpability greater than simple negligence, which has 
been described as a ‘deliberate disregard’ of the ‘high degree of 
probability’ that an injury will occur.”227 Healthcare professionals may be 
found liable under two causes of action, medical malpractice and elder 
abuse, because, in the eyes of the California Supreme Court, these can be 
two separate claims.228 
 
SERVICES (APS) ACTIVE CASES JULY 2006 - JUNE 2012 (2012), available at http://www.cdss.ca. 
gov/research/res/pdf/daptrends/SOC242M1Active.pdf. 
 220. Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. § 15600-
15675 (West 2011); see, e.g., Bergman v. Chin, No. CH205732 (Cal. Super Feb. 16, 
1999). 
 221. Gilah R. Mayer, Bergman v. Chin: Why an Elder Abuse Case is a Stride in the 
Direction of Civil Culpability for Physicians who Undertreat Patients Suffering from Terminal 
Pain, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 313, 316 (2003). 
 222. CAL. WELF. & INST. § 3333.2 (limiting non-economic losses to no more than 
$250,000). 
 223. Id. § 15657; Robert A. Mead, Unpublished Opinions and Citation Prohibitions: 
Judicial Muddling of California’s Developing Law of Elder and Dependent Adult Abuse 
Committed by Health Care Providers, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 206, 207-08 (2010). 
 224. CAL. WELF. & INST. § 15657. 
 225. Id. § 15610.57. 
 226. Id. § 15657. 
 227. Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d. 986, 991 (Cal. 1999). 
 228. Id. at 997. Despite the availability of the heightened remedy under the Elder Abuse 
Statute, the court found the case to be “in fact” based on professional negligence. Mayer, 
supra note 221, at 343. 
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A 2001 case, Bergman v. Chin, paved the path for this new legal 
theory.229 In 1998, William Bergman, 85 years old, against his wish to die 
in peace, died in agony.230 After going to the emergency room at Eden 
Medical Center, he was prescribed a very low dose of pain medication as 
well as medication PRN.231 Mr. Bergman’s lung cancer had spread, causing 
his bones to fracture.232 Over the next six days, he rated his pain from 7 up 
to 10 on a 10-point scale, indicating moderate to severe pain.233 His family 
notified physicians but little to no action was taken.234 He died three days 
later at home.235 His daughter subsequently reached out to a California 
nonprofit advocacy group, Compassion & Choices,236 for help filing suit.237 
They filed an elder abuse case against Dr. Chin, the treating physician.238 
Specifically, the plaintiff argued that Dr. Chin had been reckless when he 
neglected to establish a regimented pain management program for Mr. 
Bergman.239 
The Bergman jury found Dr. Chin had committed reckless neglect when 
he failed to adequately treat Mr. Bergman’s pain.240 Although they awarded 
the plaintiffs $1.5 million in damages, the Court reduced the jury award to 
$250,000 under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA).241 
Therefore, although heightened remedies may be available in an elder 
abuse claim against a medical professional, they were not applied here.242 
The lasting importance of the Bergman case is not the amount of damages 
awarded but instead that inadequate treatment of pain can be found as 
reckless neglect under an elder abuse theory.243 
 
 229. Bergman v. Chin, No. CH205732 (Cal. Super Feb. 16, 1999); Tyche Hendricks, 
Patient Never Complained, Says Doctor at Pain Trial, S.F. CHRON., June 6, 2001, at A17 
(noting that the Bergman case is the first of its kind). 
 230. Mayer, supra note 221, at 327, 329; Hendricks, supra note 229, at A17. 
 231. Mayer, supra note 221, at 327-28. PRN stands for “pro re nata,” meaning as the 
situation demands. STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 154, at 1427. 
 232. Mayer, supra note 221, at 328. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See id. 
 235. Id. at 329. 
 236. At the time Compassion & Choices was called the Compassion in Dying Federation. 
Compassion & Choices, Timeline, COMPASSION & CHOICES (2012), http://www.compassion 
andchoices.org/who-we-are/timeline/. 
 237. Mayer, supra note 221, at 329. 
 238. Id. at 330. 
 239. Id. at 333. 
 240. Id. at 340. 
 241. Id. at 341-42. 
 242. See Mayer, supra note 221, at 341-44 for a complete discussion of the MICRA and 
its applicability to pain cases under California’s Elder Abuse framework. 
 243. Id. at 341. 
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Plaintiffs in the Hargett case argue that the Right to Know Act reinforces 
a physician’s duty to ensure that Ms. Hargett-Beebee was fully informed of 
all available treatments for pain,244 a duty that has already been established 
under informed consent.245 By strengthening the physician’s duty, plaintiffs 
hope to make a case for recklessness.246 If successful, this landmark case 
will establish that failure to communicate with a patient about pain 
management options, including palliative sedation, falls outside of the 
standard of care.247 
In California, the Right to Know Act establishes a conditional duty on the 
part of the physician to discuss end-of-life options with her terminally ill 
patients. The act may bolster a claim of recklessness, as seen in Hargett, by 
strengthening the argument that a physician’s duty to speak to a patient 
about pain medication at the end of life is well-established. 
2. New York Follows with the Palliative Care Information Act 
In 2010, New York followed in California’s footsteps, enacting the 
Palliative Care Information Act (PCIA).248 Heralded as an “important step” 
to encourage trust and communication between patients and physicians,249 
PCIA also requires physicians to discuss end-of-life options with terminally ill 
patients.250 PCIA states that physicians “shall” speak to patients upon their 
terminal diagnosis about at least but not limited to “the range of options 
appropriate to the patient; the prognosis, risks and benefits of the various 
 
 244. Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 20-21. 
 245. Id. at 20. 
 246. Id. at 21. 
 247. A Death, a Tragedy, a Ground-Breaking Lawsuit, supra note 214. The case marches 
on as a battle of the briefs, even taking a trip to the state appellate court. Writ of Mandate, 
Hargett v. Vitas, No. A135036 (Cal. Ct. App. May 22, 2012). As of publication, the Plaintiffs 
have filed their third amended complaint, (Third Amended Complaint for Damages, Hargett v. 
Vitas, RG10547255 (Cal. Super. Feb. 8, 2013)), in response to Judge Dennis Hayashi’s 
decision sustaining with leave to amend Defendants’ demurrer regarding the claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, (Order Sustaining in Part Defendants’ Demurrer to 
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint With Leave to Amend, Hargett v. Vitas, RG10547255 
(Cal. Super. Jan. 30, 2013)), and the Defendants have filed a third demurrer, (Demurrer to 
Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, Hargett v. Vitas, RG10547255 (Cal. Super. Feb. 26, 
2013)) with a hearing on the demurrer scheduled for May 22, 2013. Importantly, the 
California Appellate Decision allowing Plaintiffs to amend their original complaint as to their 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims is the first to recognize that a hospice may owe 
a duty directly to a patient’s family. Writ of Mandate, supra 247. 
 248. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2997-c (McKinney 2011). 
 249. American Public Health Association, New York Palliative Care Information Act Model 
for the Nation, AGING & PUB. HEALTH SEC. NEWSL., Fall 2010, http://www.apha.org/member 
groups/newsletters/sectionnewsletters/aph/fall10/. 
 250. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2997-c. 
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options; and the patient’s legal rights to comprehensive pain and symptom 
management at the end of life.”251 Unlike the California statute, PCIA does 
not specifically list areas to be discussed.252 It does, however, define 
terminal illness as “an illness or condition which can reasonably be expected 
to cause death within six months, whether or not treatment is provided.”253 
Similar to the California statute, physicians still consider this terminal illness 
language to be too forceful given the uncertainty in accurate 
prognostication of death.254 
PCIA varies from California’s Right to Know Act in two important ways. 
First, it affirmatively requires, without a patient’s request, a physician to 
provide this information.255 This wording establishes an “affirmative duty” on 
the part of the physician. An affirmative duty is defined as “a duty to take a 
positive step to do something.”256 In contrast, the California act specifically 
requires “upon request” that physicians fully inform terminal patients about 
their options.257 This is a “conditional duty,” a “duty that is conditioned on 
the occurrence of an event other than the lapse of time.”258 In California, 
legislators faced fierce opposition from the California Medical Association 
(CMA) and only gained support for the legislation when they revised the 
trigger for physicians from an affirmative to a conditional one.259 In order 
for a duty to arise for the physician, the patient must first specifically ask for 
the information.260 No such condition is required by the New York statute.261 
Second, a violation of the PCIA can come with fines of up to $10,000 
and incarceration for willful violations of up to a year.262 Some controversy 
surrounds the impression that the statute itself contains the monetary and jail 
time penalties.263 However, this belief is blatantly incorrect. Under the New 
York Public Health Law, any violations of its laws are subject to a fine or jail 
time.264 This differs from the California system in which individual sections 
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 252. Id.; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5 (West 2010). 
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have penalties instead of an overarching penalty for the entire Health and 
Safety Code.265 The Right to Know Act’s codification does not include a 
penalty for violations.266 
New York’s approach to improving physician-patient communication is, 
in some ways, more stringent than that of California. Neither approach has 
been fully tested and controversy remains over their role in the physician-
patient relationship. 
B. The Failures: Why a State-Level Solution is Inadequate 
A state law solution is not viable for two reasons: 1) the California and 
New York statutes have enforcement flaws and 2) both sweeping and 
uniform state-level changes seem unlikely. In New York, a physician may be 
fined up to $10,000 per violation and may face incarceration of up to a 
year for any “willful” violation of the New York Public Health Law.267 Like the 
California elder abuse law, more than mere negligence is required.268 
“Willful” is defined as a deliberate and voluntary action.269 Physicians have 
been convicted of willfully neglecting their patients under the public health 
laws of New York.270 However, a review of the cases brought under the 
statute shows that they fall into three distinct categories: obvious medical 
malpractice cases, illegal drug distribution, or fee-splitting arrangements.271 
The low number of cases could indicate that physicians are not being held 
accountable under this statute, or that, if they are, the penalties are not 
significant enough to fight in court. Adding in the political backlash of the 
PCIA,272 it seems highly unlikely that physicians will be significantly 
motivated by a PCIA violation. 
Additionally, other avenues of enforcement in New York do not seem 
possible. Whereas California has some of the most protective elder abuse 
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laws in the country,273 New York does not have a similar civil statute.274 
Therefore, in New York, an elder abuse claim for monetary damages would 
not be possible. New York attorneys could approach cases like Hargett 
through medical malpractice; New York does not have a cap on 
damages.275 Perhaps PCIA could be used to further strengthen the argument 
that the duty is well-known and therefore disregarding the duty would be 
reckless, similar to the plaintiff’s argument in Hargett. However, as 
previously noted,276 evidence suggests that pain management medical 
malpractice cases can be hard to prove given differing pain management 
standards.277 
California’s Right to Know Act will also face enforcement challenges. 
Although California has a stronger elder abuse framework than New 
York,278 this enforcement strategy has several flaws. First, heightened 
remedies are only afforded to those cases in which “recklessness” can be 
proved.279 Recklessness is defined in Delany as a “subjective state of 
culpability greater than simple negligence, which has been described as a 
‘deliberate disregard’ of the ‘high degree of probability’ that an injury will 
occur.”280 Although Bergman established that this “recklessness” standard 
could apply to inadequate pain management,281 neither Delany nor 
Bergman establishes where the line between professional negligence and 
reckless neglect can be drawn.282 
Also, if an action can be brought under an elder abuse theory, as it has 
been in Bergman,283 Hargett and other similar cases remain undecided as to 
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who may be covered by the elder abuse statute.284 Ms. Hargett-Beebee was 
not an elder adult.285 Instead, the plaintiffs are arguing she was a 
“dependent adult” because of her physical illness at the end of life.286 
However, Ms. Hargett-Beebee may not fall under the elder abuse statute’s 
definition.287 Relying on the statute’s legislative intent,288 the defendants in 
the Hargett case argue that her inclusion may implicate the inclusion of 
every individual at the end of life.289 However, perhaps the statute should 
protect every individual at the end of life because almost every individual 
reaches old age and is afforded the protections of the law. Regardless, there 
is some doubt as to whether the courts will extend this protection.290 Further, 
if the Hargett theory does prevail, damages could be limited as they were in 
the Bergman case.291 
Currently, California and New York are the only states that have explicit 
right to know laws.292 Several states have introduced some form of a right to 
know bill with varied success.293 However, a state-by-state solution would 
take time. One possibility could be the promulgation and passage of a 
Uniform Law Commission (ULC) uniform or model act that states could then 
 
 284. See Defendants’ Demurrer, Hargett v. Vitas, No. RG10547255 (Cal. Super. July 21, 
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adopt.294 A proposal has been introduced to the Uniform Law Commission’s 
Committee on Scope and Program295 recommending that a uniform state 
statute requiring conversations at the end of life be promulgated.296 The 
uniform law theory has not picked up steam, as the most recent petition was 
denied.297 Even if it were to gain momentum, a question remains as to what 
the uniform statute would look like. Although the New York right to know 
law, PCIA, provides criminal penalties,298 the California statute does not.299 
Another important question is whether the physician’s duty would be 
affirmative, like in PCIA, or conditional, like in the California Right to Know 
Act.300 
A state level solution may not be effective at this point. Both California 
and New York’s right to know statutes face enforcement challenges and a 
uniform model act not only does not seem likely, but also raises issues as to 
how such an act would be modeled. 
IV.  A FEDERAL SOLUTION? 
A federal standard would not only eliminate the issue of uniformity 
among the states, but could also be a signal to physicians of the importance 
of this end-of-life conversation. However, recent events have shown that a 
legislative remedy would likely not be feasible.301 Fears of “death panels” 
and “pull the plug on Grandma” effectively quashed earlier versions of the 
Affordable Care Act.302 Although Section 1233 of H.R. 3200, an “advance 
planning consultation” provided for just that, a conversation,303 fears of 
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rationing healthcare at the end of life led to its removal from the bill.304 As 
the recent legislative debacles illustrate, partisanship and intense in-fighting 
has not subsided, further limiting the possibility of a federal legislative 
solution.305 
Instead of opting for a legislative solution, a provision should be added 
to the Medicare Conditions of Participation (COPs) for hospitals. COPs are 
one of the two sets of requirements that healthcare entities must meet to 
qualify for Medicare reimbursement.306 The statutory authority for 
“conditions of participation” is generally found in the Medicare statute’s307 
definition of the institution.308 For hospitals, this statutory authority is found 
under Section 1395x(e)(9).309 A hospital is an institution which “meets such 
other requirements as the Secretary finds necessary in the interest of the 
health and safety of individuals who are furnished services in the 
institution.”310 These “other requirements,” or COPs, are codified at 42 
C.F.R. § 482.311 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services develop 
 
 304. Christi Parsons & Andrew Zajac, Senate Committee Scraps Healthcare Provision That 
Gave Rise to ‘Death Panel’ Claims, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2009/aug/14/nation/na-health-end-of-life14. 
 305. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Tensions Escalate as Stakes Grow in Fiscal Clash, N.Y. TIMES, 
(July 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/us/politics/14fiscal.html?pagewant 
ed=all. 
 306. Healthcare entities must meet certain requirements to qualify for Medicare 
reimbursement including conditions of participation (Part A) and conditions of coverage (Part 
B). FURROW ET AL., supra note 20, at 547-48. Medicare Part A coverage includes hospital care 
whereas Part B provides for outpatient services. Id. at 541 (Medicare Part A “covers hospital 
care for up to ninety days for any ‘spell of illness,’ plus up to sixty ‘life time reserve days’ 
available on a one time basis. . . . For hospital patients, Medicare part A covers semiprivate 
accommodations; ordinary nursing services; use of hospital facilities and social services; 
drugs, biologicals, supplies, appliances and equipment ordinarily furnished in the hospital for 
hospital care; and other diagnostic or therapeutic items or services ordinarily furnished by the 
hospital to inpatients.”); id. at 542-43 (Medicare Part B covers: physician services, physician 
office services and supplies, outpatient and partial hospital services, outpatient diagnostic 
services, outpatient physical, occupational and speech therapy and more). For a complete list 
see id. at 543-44. 
 307. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102, 79 Stat. 286, 291 
(1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2012)); FURROW ET AL., supra note 20, at 550. 
 308. FURROW ET AL., supra note 20, at 550. 
 309. In 1965, section 102 of the Social Security Amendments of 1965 created “Health 
Insurance for the Aged.” Social Security Amendments, § 102.  Section 1861 was added 
defining a “hospital.” Id. This provision has been codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1395x(e)(9) (2012); FURROW ET AL., supra note 20, at 547-48. 
 310. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(9). 
 311. 42 C.F.R. § 482 (2011) (Conditions of Participation for Hospitals); id. § 488.1 
(defining “conditions of participation” as “the requirements providers other than skilled nursing 
facilities must meet to participate in the Medicare program and includes conditions of 
certification for rural health clinics”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] A NUDGE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION WITH A STICK THE SIZE OF CMS 419 
the COPs312 while state survey agencies review hospital compliance.313 A 
hospital may be removed from a state survey agency’s list if the Joint 
Commission or the American Osteopathic Association accredits it.314 No 
matter the path, a hospital must meet or exceed the COPs in order to 
receive Medicare reimbursement.315 
Although conditions of participation are required for all healthcare 
facilities, excluding nursing homes,316 this paper focuses on those of 
hospitals because most individuals find themselves at the end of life in a 
hospital setting and are more likely to be diagnosed with a terminal illness in 
this same setting.317 Additionally, hospital conditions of participation include 
hospital outpatient services.318 The reach of hospital COPs may increase 
with the advent of the Accountable Care Organization.319 COPs for these 
increasingly integrated organizations, which may include linked physician 
groups and hospitals, will likely be similar to those for hospitals.320 
Conditions of participation, like most agency regulations,321 must go 
through an informal rule-making process.322 First, CMS releases a notice of 
proposed rulemaking in the federal register.323 After publication, a period 
 
 312. Conditions for Coverage (CFCs) and Conditions of Participations (COPs), CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (May 11, 2012), https://www.cms.gov/CFCsAndCoPs/01_Over 
view.asp#TopOfPage [hereinafter CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Conditions for 
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 313. Survey & Certification - Certification & Compliance, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS. (July 23, 2012), https://www.cms.gov/CertificationandComplianc/08_Hospi tals.asp. 
 314. 42 C.F.R. § 488.3(b). 
 315. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Conditions for Coverage, supra note 312. 
 316. 42 C.F.R. § 488.1. 
 317. See e.g., Levin et al., supra note 148, at 433 (22% of all deaths in the U.S. occur in 
the intensive care unit). 
 318. 42 C.F.R. § 482.54. 
 319. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat. 
119, 395 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 1395). Very generally, an ACO is a group of 
providers working together to manage and coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-service 
beneficiaries. Accountable Care Organizations (ACO), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 
(Apr. 5, 2012), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/in 
dex.html?redirect=/ACO/. 
 320. See Steven M. Lieberman & John M. Bertko, Building Regulatory And Operational 
Flexibility Into Accountable Care Organizations and ‘Shared Savings’, 30 HEALTH AFF. 23, 25-
26 (2011) (noting the needed flexibility for ACOs that can be attained through a regulatory 
framework). 
 321. RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 380 (5th ed. 2006). 
 322. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); CASS ET AL., supra note 321, at 380; CMS, Quarterly 
Provider Updates, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (May 14, 2012), https://www.cms. 
gov/quarterlyproviderupdates/ [hereinafter CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Quarterly 
Providers Updates]. 
 323. U.S.C. § 553(b); CASS ET AL., supra note 321, at 380; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., Quarterly Providers Updates, supra note 322. 
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for public comment remains open.324 In the case of COPs, CMS leaves the 
period open for 30 to 60 days.325 Publication of the final rule must occur at 
least 30 days prior to its implementation326 and include a “concise general 
statement of [the rule’s] basis and purpose.”327 Some have argued that this 
process is lengthy.328 However, this may be preferable to the legislative 
process where, currently, issues regarding the end of life appear to be a 
non-starter.329 Further, COPs are updated regularly, based on provider,330 
and have been used in the past to address social issues.331 
COPs provide several benefits that neither a state-level nor federal 
legislative solution can. The goal of any proposed solution should be to 
encourage the conversation, not to just provide a remedy for individuals if 
an end-of-life conversation does not occur. Unlike a state-level solution, 
such as those of California and New York,332 a change to the COP would 
be preemptive instead of retributive. A hospital’s noncompliance with the 
COPs can result in termination of the Medicare agreement with that 
provider.333 Although termination is retributive, this penalty is so severe that 
hospitals focus time, energy, and money to comply with the conditions of 
participation, making COPs essentially mandatory principles.334 Also, again, 
unlike the state laws, revision of the COPs creates a uniform guideline for 
providers. 
A COP solution is also preferable to a federal legislative solution. In 
addition to the previously mentioned political issues, finalization of an 
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 325. CASS ET AL., supra note 321, at 380; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
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Happen to You, AHLA CONNECTIONS, Aug. 2009, at 26, available at http://www.healthlaw 
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agency rule takes significantly less time than finalizing a law.335 Agency 
flexibility and expertise are beneficial in these situations. Drafting, proposing, 
amending and ultimately adopting a proposed bill takes time and is often 
unsuccessful.336 At the agency level, experts can better evaluate the impact 
of a policy decision and adjust accordingly.337 For this reason, like in this 
case,338 Congress usually passes legislation with a broad framework while 
leaving the specifics to federal agencies.339 Further, CMS has already 
stepped into the area of the end of life with a rule requiring hospitals to 
maintain an advance directive policy.340 Hospitals must also provide written 
information about a patient’s rights, under state law, to make “decisions 
concerning such medical care.”341 Therefore, CMS already has expertise 
and experience in promulgating rules relevant to conversations at the end of 
life. 
CMS should revise the COPs to include a provision that specifically 
addresses conversations at the end of life. Section 482.13(b) sets standards 
for the promotion and protection of a patient’s rights.342 Included in the list 
of rights is a statement on informed consent: 
The patient or his or her representative . . . has the right to make informed 
decisions regarding his or her care. The patient’s rights include being 
informed of his or her health status, being involved in care planning and 
treatment, and being able to request or refuse treatment. This right must not 
be construed as a mechanism to demand the provision of treatment or 
services deemed medically unnecessary or inappropriate. 
 
 335. See supra text accompanying notes 296-304. 
 336. See, e.g., Kathy L. Cerminara & Seth M. Bogin, A Paper about a Piece of Paper: 
Regulatory Action as the Most Effective Way to Promote Use of Physician Orders for Life-
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for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST) regulatory solution has the benefits of agency flexibility 
and expertise). 
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 340. 42 C.F.R. §§ 489.100-.104 (2011). 
 341. 42 C.F.R. § 489.102. 
 342. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(b) (2011) (“Conditions of Participation: Patient’s Rights”). 
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Despite the requirement, such behavior at the end of life is not occurring.343 
However, if the provision were revised to read the following, perhaps 
physicians and hospitals would take this responsibility more seriously: 
The patient or his or her representative . . . has the right to make informed 
decisions regarding his or her care. The patient’s rights include being 
informed of his or her health status and his or her treatment options, with 
specific regard to those treatment options regarding end-of-life care, being 
involved in care planning and treatment, and being able to request or 
refuse treatment. This right must not be construed as a mechanism to 
demand the provision of treatment or services deemed medically 
unnecessary or inappropriate. 
If the hospital were held responsible for ensuring that treatment options were 
provided to patients, at the very least a nurse, and very likely a physician, 
would speak with a patient about his or her options. 
A modification of the COPs as suggested above would address several 
key palliative care problems. As mentioned previously, individuals using 
hospice either have very short or very long stays.344 By encouraging 
communication at the end of life, this regulation will likely increase the 
number of days individuals spend in hospice. Patients will be better informed 
about their disease state and healthcare providers will likely be more 
comfortable discussing hospice. Additionally, a regulation modification 
would address hospice’s cherry-picking of non-cancerous residents.345 Not 
just some patients, but all, would have information about the end of life and 
hospice. 
A modification of the COPs would be the best solution to the problem of 
patient-physician communication at the end of life and especially about pain 
medication and palliative sedation. It provides a non-retributive and unified 
method of pushing physicians and hospitals to do the right thing. Also, it 
would be more timely and flexible than a legislative solution. Further, CMS 
already has expertise and experience in this area. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Terminally ill patients have the right to be adequately informed about 
their palliative care treatment options, including palliative sedation. 
Palliative care provides caregivers and patients with an improved quality of 
life while reducing healthcare costs. Despite these proven benefits, people 
continue to suffer agonizing deaths because of failures in hospice benefits, 
communication, and pain management. Both California and New York 
 
 343. See supra Part II.B. 
 344. See supra Part II.B. 
 345. See supra Part II.B. 
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have addressed these deficiencies with right-to-know acts. In California, 
attorneys have used its Act to support a claim for elder abuse, whereas in 
New York, physicians may be subject to a fine or even jail time. 
However, a state law solution does not seem viable. Both states’ statutes 
have enforcement flaws. California stands alone in the strength of its elder 
abuse statute and Hargett faces serious challenges. In New York, 
enforcement is equally doubtful given the few number of physician public 
health law violations and the outrage the act has caused in the physician 
community. In addition, sweeping and uniform state-level change does not 
appear likely. Although a model uniform act has been proposed, it has not 
gained momentum and questions remain about how it would be modeled. 
A federal solution offers the benefits of proactivity and uniformity. 
However, a national legislative solution is not ideal. The process to see a 
proposed bill through Congress can be cumbersome and wrought with 
political turmoil. On the other hand, amending the COPs under CMS’s 
rulemaking authority provides needed flexibility, timeliness, and expertise. A 
modification of the COPs would nudge physicians in the right direction and 
encourage them to speak with patients about end-of-life treatment options, 
thus beginning to mend the broken promise of palliative care. 
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